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March 1, 1948

MEMORANDUM TO ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: [] to be considered in choosing between
Sasebo, Japan and Hoko Point, Okinawa for the location
of an FBI Far East Monitoring Station.

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1. As a result of my visit during the period January 21, 1948 to February 28, 1948 to FBI West Coast and Pacific installations and to the sites under consideration for the location of an FBI Far East Monitoring Station at Sasebo, Japan and Hoko Point, Okinawa, it is my opinion that the major factors to be considered in choosing between these two sites are as tabulated below. In making the remarks pertinent to each site the following assumptions have been made.

- a. That the Military Occupation of Japan will be terminated in the not too distant future, leaving no other United States Government Agency located in proximity to Sasebo from which FBI could expect any support or assistance.
- b. That the United States Government will retain Okinawa permanently and that United States Armed Forces and installations will be located thereon. This is certainly indicated by the program of permanent construction started and planned, which it is my understanding is to be paid for by the United States Government.
- c. That adequate funds are at present available for the construction of the proposed station at either of the locations being considered in either permanent or temporary structures.
- d. That the funds mentioned in c above must be obligated by 1 July 1948 or be lost to the Central Intelligence Agency.

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SASEBO, JAPAN

MOLO POINT, OKINAWA

1. Technical Consideration

a. Antenna Field

The area is adequate for 5 Rhombic antennas and 5 Beverage wave antennas but does not allow for desired spacing between antennas. These would give satisfactory but certainly not ideal coverage. 7 Rhombic and 7 Beverage wave antennas to be used as indicated in the attached chart are desirable. Erection of additional antennas for diversity reception, which is highly desirable, would of course be impossible.

Ample area is available to build an excellently engineered antenna field under ideal technical conditions.

b. Reception Conditions

Despite the fact that it is believed to be the best location in Japan and that it would be satisfactory, any monitoring operation installed there would suffer material interference to adequate coverage of Asiatic stations in the Medium Wave band due to the multitude of nearby Japanese Medium Wave stations.

Presents the best overall reception conditions to satisfactory coverage of the whole Far East known to FRIG. Doubtful that overall conditions could be improved much at any other one location

c. Communications
(This factor is of paramount importance)

It would be necessary to erect a radio-teletype transmitter in order to file material to Washington and to install radio-teletype receiving equipment in order to be able to receive from Washington. It would also be necessary to rely upon the Japanese Government to maintain and operate the transmitter after the occupation is terminated. There would be no possible way of insuring efficient operation and maintenance even though agreed to by the Japanese Government. It would also be necessary to find and arrange for the use of a suitable transmitter site, which should be at least 5 miles from the monitoring station. The alternative would be to pay at least \$500,000 per year to transmit our file commercially after the end of the occupation.

The ARMY Communications network gives excellent assurance of continued efficient communication service for an indefinite period.

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2. Administrative and Support Considerations

a. Staffing and Sourcing

Japanese citizens repatriated from Okinawa throughout the war and foreign nationals who were wartime students in Japan provide an excellent field for recruiting and staffing a station with well qualified linguists at low cost.

Very few suitable linguists could be recruited on Okinawa. It would be necessary to recruit elsewhere and transport employees to the Station for a one or two year period and after this period of duty to transport them to their homes for brief leaves of absence. It probably would be necessary to pay higher salaries than at Sasebo in order to attract employees to Okinawa.

b. Housing

Necessary to provide housing for employees sent out from the mainland or Hawaii only. Linguists etc. hired locally would be expected to find their own housing in Sasebo.

Necessary to establish and operate a camp for all employees; would require considerable additional housing and entail much greater administrative responsibilities.

c. Road net

Site is about 3 miles from City of Sasebo. Between one and two miles of the road is up steep grade and is very narrow and winding. In its present condition it is suitable for jeep traffic only and even for this would be dangerous at night. This road would need to be improved and maintained. With the present attitude of General Headquarters toward the impoverished Japanese nation, it is questionable whether the Japanese Government could be forced to improve and maintain this road, which at present is used by practically no motorized traffic.

A good road net exists on Okinawa and it is reasonable to expect that the Armed Forces located there will maintain it in excellent condition.

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1. Support from
other U. S.
Government
Agencies

After occupation no other Government agency would be in Sasebo. It would be necessary to operate a small isolated station almost completely dependent upon the Japanese City of Sasebo for food, supplies, recreation, schooling and medical attention. There is no Caucasian Colony in Sasebo. There would be no American entertainment or schools for American children. Good railway transportation to other cities is available. It is questionable whether present friendly attitude of the Japanese toward Americans will continue after the occupation.

After Post Occupation,
Commissioners, hospitals,
recreation and entertainment
would be available. American
schools would be available to
dependent children. Airlines
operate to all major cities
in the Far East.

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2. General Information

Although I was instructed prior to my departure from Washington not to open formally with General Headquarters in Tokyo the question of the proposed FRII station, the following information gained through informal discussions with the Commanding Officer, 34th Infantry Regiment at Isebo, Staff Officers at Ryken Headquarters on Okinawa and Staff Officers at General Headquarters in Tokyo is considered pertinent and reliable.

- a. Since FRII indicated sometime ago that we had no further interest in the Isebo site it is no longer being held for us. Much salvageable construction material is available on the site, and if it is to be further considered, immediate steps should be taken to have the site and the material set aside again.
- b. Construction costs in Japan are today 25% to 35% higher than when the rough estimate of \$250,000 for construction at the Isebo site was made in the summer of 1947. This rough estimate did not include the cost of a transmitter, which would probably reach an additional \$100,000. Similar rough estimates for construction on Okinawa have been stated as \$450,000 with temporary-type staff housing, or \$650,000 with permanent-type staff housing.
- c. The contractor engaged by the Army Engineers to do permanent type construction on Okinawa has abandoned the job reportedly because of financial losses, and is returning his personnel to the United States. Funds appropriated for construction on Okinawa have been expended. Permanent type construction is at present at a standstill with the program far from finished and many individual structures left in a half-completed stage. It is doubtful that permanent type construction for an FRII installation could be undertaken in the near future. A limited number of American-trained Okinawa labor battalions capable of undertaking temporary construction are available.

3. Conclusions. It is concluded that:

- a. From the standpoint of recruiting, staffing, and housing, and of accessibility to other parts of Japan, Isebo is a more favorable location than Okinawa.
- b. From the standpoint of communications, the support and assistance required by the operation from other United States Government agencies, and of roads to the proposed sites, Okinawa is a more favorable location than Isebo.
- c. From a purely technical standpoint Okinawa is clearly preferable to Isebo.
- d. From the standpoint of costs, estimates for Isebo, including radio-teletype transmitter, approximate those for temporary structures on Okinawa. It is believed that permanent staff housing would increase Okinawa construction costs by less than the expenditures at Isebo for two years for permanent communications which would probably be required to insure

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reliability after termination.

4. Recommendations. It is recommended that:

- a. A major Far East Monitoring Station be established at Solo Point on the Island of Okinawa.
- b. The structure be of permanent type if it is possible to undertake this type of structure at this time and to obligate all funds connected therewith prior to 1 July 1948.
- c. If recommendation b above is not possible, the structure be of temporary type and that all funds be obligated prior to 1 July 1948.
- d. That this matter be acted upon with the utmost dispatch in order to:
 - (1) Obligate the necessary funds at the earliest possible date, and
 - (2) To establish the earliest possible coverage of important Far East Radio which it is impossible to cover from any existing FEIS station.

L. K. WHITE
Chief, FEIS

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